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Abstract
Corrupt bureaucrats manipulate rules and regulations to coerce the private agents to pay
bribes. In such an environment the cost of dealing with the public sector is uncertain as the
regulations are not observed as they are originally deﬁned. Combined with weak enforcement
and compliance, predation of corrupt bureaucrats makes private disposable income volatile.
We study this uncertainty within a stochastic dynamic growth model framework, where we
generalize the corruption caused uncertainty as a shock to disposable income of agents. Con-
sequently, corruption creates two adverse eﬀects in the economy: higher risks associated with
private investments and lower returns on private capital due to increased public burden. Both
eﬀects tend to lower the demand for investments, thus long run growth is compromised in the
economy with the corrupt public sector.
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1. Introduction
In economies with weak institutions, public oﬃcials apply rules and regula-
tions subjectively. This leads to increased uncertainty for the private agents, as
their disposable income may vary depending on the interactions with the public
oﬃcials. In this chapter, we would like to investigate how this type of uncertainty
aﬀects economic growth.
Bewley (1977) gives a start to a large body of literature that studied growth
impact of the labour income risk. The most recent Bewleytype models include
Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1997), Calvet (2001). These models mainly focus on
the precautionary saving and wealth distribution caused by the individual labour
income uncertainty. These models assume no aggregate uncertainty, however,
allowing risk at the individual level. These studies ﬁnd that the labour-income
risk leads to lower interest rates and over-saving in the steady state.
A natural extension of Bewley-type models is to investigate the impact of id-
iosyncratic risk in production and investment. This new line of literature initiated
by Angeletos (2007), Angeletos and Calvet (2005). Their ﬁnding diﬀers from the
original Bewley models in that they predict both lower interest rates and lower
capital accumulation due to investment risk. In other words, in the presence
of production uncertainty, risk aversion dominates over the precautionary saving
behaviour of the agents. 2
The results of the above-mentioned research show that volatility might stem
from diﬀerent facets of economic activity. In line with this, Denizer et al. (2000)
state that corruption can be also an important factor contributing to volatility.
Campos (2001) argues that not only the level of corruption is important, but
also its predictability plays signiﬁcant role in determining its growth impact. This
ﬁnding is in concordance with Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who state that the
secrecy stemming out of the illegal nature of corruption imposes an additional
burden on the economy. It is clear that the secrecy adds to the uncertainty
associated with corruption, and thus, it can contribute to overall volatility in
the economy. However, the literature lacks a model that incorporates corruption
2The other strand of studies aim at laying down the theoretical basis of the relationship
between risk and growth at the aggregate level. See e.g Eaton (1981), Gertler and Grinols
(1982), Grinols and Turnovsky (1993, 1998), Krusell and Smith (1998). Examples of empirical
analysis include Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989), Tsai et al. (1997),
Corsetti et al. (1999), Easterly et al. (2000), Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion
(1993, 1999).
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caused uncertainty.
There are a signiﬁcant body of literature dedicated to the investigation of
growth impact of corruption, however, the literature on corruption has neglected
the growth impact of the uncertainty created by corruption.3 An attempt to
account for the uncertainty stemming out of the institutional structure of the
economy has been done by Lin and Yang (2001). They investigate a stochastic
growth model with the uncertainty caused by tax evasion.
I model uncertainty caused by institutions like in Lin and Yang (2001) and
Eichhorn (2006), albeit from a broader perspective by taking account of both
taxation and public good provision. For this purpose I apply the underlying idea
of the Bewley-Angeletos type models to analyse the eﬀects of such uncertainty
on saving and investment. In particular, I adjust the growth model developed
by Angeletos and Calvet (2006) for the production with idiosyncratic risk to the
case, when disposable income bears the idiosyncratic risk caused by corruption.
It is shown that the idiosyncratic risk reﬂected by disposable income negatively
aﬀects evolution of the economy.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: ﬁrst,the intuition of the model
is outlined, then a brief description of the tools used in dynamic optimization is
presented, next the set-up of the model is described, then the implications based
on the optimal solution obtained for the model are analysed.
2. Stochastic disposable income
Corruption usually implies deviation from what is considered to be normal
or required by regulations or law. In other words, corrupt public oﬃcials distort
rules and regulations. They do it in order to create and capture private rents
for themselves. Corrupt transactions are clandestine and therefore, associated
with risk. In the environment with corrupt bureaucracy the allocation of govern-
ment contracts and licenses is unpredictable, as the rules of game are not clear.
Therefore, the private ﬁrms' output depending on such contracts and licenses
are also subject to uncertainty. The poor tax administration and corruption of
tax inspectors also lead to uncertain outcomes for the taxpayers.
Let us ﬁrst describe how corruption can enter the interactions between the
private and public sectors. Assume that each inﬁnitely-living individual owns a
3For example, Leﬀ (1964), Huntington (1968), Liu (1985, 1996), Mauro (1995, 1998,
2004), Rose-Ackerman (1998, 1999, 2002, 2004), Barreto (2000), Barelli and Pessoa (2002),
Rivera-Baitiz (2002), Acconcia (2006), have studied growth eﬀects of corruption.
3
Figure 1: Mechanics of disposable income determination
ﬁrm and produces a single good, and this process of production is deterministic.
The government imposes income tax with a ﬂat rate. The ﬁrms try to maximize
their expected disposable income by evading taxes.
The possible outcomes for the interaction between the private and public
sectors are illustrated by a tree (See Figure 1). The following is the description
of those interactions and outcomes.
• The agent produces output equal to y, but reports only (1− e)y and thus
pays the tax equal to (1− e)τy. As we earlier indicated the evasion rate ,
e is random and determined in (0, 1).
• Tax auditors randomly select ﬁrms and examine their tax returns. The
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probability of being audited is given by pi. The auditors can reveal tax
evasion with the probability given by pd = ξe, where ξ is a parameter
of tax administration eﬃciency. It is also possible that the extent of tax
evasion is revealed in a range of (0, 1).
• If not detected taxpayer's after-tax income is (1 − eτ)y. If detected then
it depends on whether the tax inspector is corrupt or not.
 The honest tax inspector would make the taxpayer to pay the unpaid
tax with a surcharge. That would leave the taxpayer with after-tax
income equal to (1− eφτ)y, φ > 1.
 The corrupt tax inspector would get a bribe amount, which is less
than the sum of penalty for tax evasion and unpaid tax. In this case
the taxpayers after-tax income is given by (1− ebτ)y, b < 1.
 The expected after tax income is 1− eτ{1+ pipd[(1− pc)φ+ pcb]}y.
• We assume that the predatory public oﬃcials, who regulate the economy,
extract a fraction of ﬁrms' (a.k.a. taxpayers) income with probability v.
In this case the expected disposable income of the ﬁrm is given by (1 −
vθ[1 + pipd((1− pc)φ+ pcb)]eτ)y, where θ is a coeﬃcient that reﬂects an
eﬀective increase in the burden for the ﬁrm due to extortion.
Therefore, we conclude that in a corrupt environment, depending on the
outcomes in tax evasion and regulations, the disposable income of the taxpayers
is stochastic, and may vary in a range of (1 − eτ)y and (1 − θφeτ)y. The
former is the best outcome, while the latter is the worst outcome with respect
to disposable income of an agent.
3. The model
3.1. The Agents
We assume continuum of inﬁnitely-living households. There are two types of
households: i) producers, ii) bureaucrats. Each producer-household owns a ﬁrm
and produces a single good using its labour. The bureaucrat households supply
labour to the public sector.
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3.2. The public budget
The stochastic nature of the tax collections results not only in uncertainty
for the individuals, but certainly the government faces uncertainty in collecting
tax revenue from the individuals. However, we assume that the public sector
ﬁrst pools all the funds collected then uses it for the public goods production.
Therefore, for the public sector only the aggregate tax revenue is important.
With corruption tax evasion is higher, which leads to lower tax revenue being
collected. With weak institutions the government budget is ineﬃciently and
inappropriately utilised. This situation results in a fraction of the public funds
being wasted on unproductive activities such as excessive red tape creation or
extortions for the self-beneﬁt of the bureaucrats. Ultimately, the productive
input provided by the public sector is lower in the environment with corrupt
bureaucracy.
Denote the income of agent j eﬀectively taxed by yτ . Then at the aggregate
level public funds are just the sum of the tax revenues paid by each taxpayer,
T = τµyτN
where µyτ the average income taxed, N is the total number of taxpayers. Tax
evasion with corruption results in that the average income taxed is less than the
average true income, µyτ < µy =
∑N
j=1 yj
N
. In other words, the tax revenue in the
environment with corruption is lower than the potentially attainable amount.
We can assume that on average a fraction of this revenue is misused and
therefore, the government's productive input into the private production is given
by:
g(t) = ζT (t), ζ < 1 (1)
The assumption here is that the budget is balanced and without corruption the
eﬃciency coeﬃcient satisﬁes ζ = 1. The conclusion we can draw from this
condition is that corruption ridden governments provide less productive input
into private production.
3.3. Individual Preferences
As it is argued earlier, disposable income of the agents are stochastic due to
corruption and given by yd = A · h · f(k, g). To this type of stochastic process
we can apply the model developed by Angeletos and Calvet (2006). The main
idea behind this approach is to formulate the individual agent's choice in such a
manner that the tendency to intertemporal substitution and risk aversion can be
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separated. Our model diﬀers from the case modelled by Angeletos and Calvet
(2006) in that the uncertainty in our case is caused by corruption, while Angeletos
and Calvet investigated the uncertainty in production. Their production function
has the following form:
y = Atf(kt) (2)
The technological coeﬃcient At is a stochastic variable, thus captures pro-
duction uncertainty. It is assumed that At follows Gaussian (normal) distribution
and i.i.d across agents and periods, that is At ∼ N(1, σ2).
Instead of technological shock, we assume institutional shocks, which then
replaces At in (2) with A ·ht. That is we are assuming ht ∼ N(µh, σ2h), whereas
the the technology is deterministic. It is assumed that time is discrete and
inﬁnite. We consider a continuum of inﬁnitely living household-producers with
possibility of short-term asset holding. That is the agents can borrow and lend
at economy-wide interest rate r, and sum of all assets equal to zero. Borrowed
money is always repaid and no-Ponzi game is assumed.
We also should have some ideas about what the expected value for h(t)
should be. In the ﬁrst-best world µh = (1− τ) should hold as the ﬁrms in their
interaction with the public sector have only to give a part of their income in the
form of taxes. However, in the world with corrupt bureaucrats, as we discussed
in the foregoing, h(t) is a distribution, with diﬀerent realized values for each
private agent in the given period of time. Due to this fact we can state that
the expected value for the institutional-shock function E[h(t)] = µh = (1− ετ),
where ε = E[(e, θφe)]. In the environment with predatory public sector, the
burden of extortion can over-weigh the gains from tax evasion, thus ε > 1 is
possible.
We assume that the agents' expected utility function is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct) (3)
where u(c) = −ψ exp
(−c/ψ), and subject to budget constraint. The budget
constraint in period t is given by
ct + it + at = ydt + (1 + rt−1)at−1 (4)
where ct is consumption, it is capital investment at is asset holdings, ydt is
disposable income from production, r is rate of return on assets. The capital
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accumulation evolves according to the rule:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (5)
Combining (4) and (5) yields a budget constraint in a stock variable form:
ct + kt+1 + at = zt, (6)
where zt is the state variable given by,
zt = htf(kt, gt) + (1− δ)kt + (1 + rt−1)at−1 (7)
It is assumed that the coeﬃcient of technology in the production function is
given by A = 1 for simplicity.
The household chooses a contingent plan {ct, kt+1, at}∞t=0 that maximizes
expected lifetime utility (3) subject to (6). Given the uncorrelated nature of the
idiosyncratic risks over time, the state of the household in period t is characterized
by the individual wealth zt.
3.4. Individual choice
The utility maximization problem leads to the Bellman equation
u[Vt(xt)] = max
ct,kt+1,at
u(ct) + βu[CEt]. (8)
As the random variable ht is assumed to be normally distributed, the state
variable zt is also normal.
In (8) the concept of certainty equivalent is used . The certainty equivalent
is the constant amount of wealth CE(Y ) the utility of which is the same as the
expected utility of a random variable Y : U(CE(Y )) = E[U(Y )]. As we know, for
the concave utility functions the Jensen's inequality holds: U(E[Y ]) ≥ E[U(Y )].
From this risk-aversion property, a risk-averse agent always prefers a sure amount
of cash to the expected income that satisﬁes the condition: CE(Y ) ≤ E[Y ]. The
diﬀerence E[Y ]−CE(Y ) can be treated as risk premium. This risk premium can
be approximated. Let us denote µY = E[Y ]. Applying Taylor's expansion to the
utility function we can write an approximation
U(Y ) ≈ U(µY ) + (Y − µY )U ′(µY ) + 12(Y − µY )2U ′′(µY ). (9)
Taking expectations of (9) yields
E[U(Y )] ≈ U(µY ) + 12V ar[Y ]U ′′(µY ) (10)
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Taking into account the deﬁnition of the certainty equivalent and using Tay-
lor's expansion once more we obtain
E[U(Y )] = U [CE(Y )] ≈ U(µY ) + [CE(Y )− µY ]U ′(µY ). (11)
Using (10) and (11) we get the expression for the risk premium
µY − CE(Y ) ≈ 1
2
U ′(µY )
U ′′(µY )
V ar[Y ]. (12)
In our case the certainty equivalent of Vt+1 is given by CEt = Vt+1(Etzt+1−
Γt
2
V artzt+1). Here Γt is a measure of risk aversion; a higher values for Γt imply
higher risk aversion. The certainty equivalent is a value function of the diﬀerence
of the expected value of zt+1 and the product of the variance of zt+1 and a risk
aversion measure.
The expected value of the state variable is given by Etzt+1 = µhf(kt+1, gt+1)+
(1−δ)kt+1+(1+rt)at, and V artzt+1 = (µh)2f(kt+1, gt+1)2σ2h. Taking this result
into account the agent's problem is written as follows:
maxu(ct) + βu{Vt+1[µhf(kt+1, gt+1) + (1− δ)kt+1 + (1 + rt)at
−Γt
2
(µ2hf(kt+1, gt+1)
2σ2h)]} (13)
subject to ct + kt+1 + at = zt.
The simplest value and consumption function that solves our dynamic prob-
lem can be presented by Vt(z) = λtzt + bt and ct = λˆtzt + bˆt.
The FOCs of (13) with respect to kt+1 and at yield
u′(ct) = βu′(Vt+1)λt+1{(1− δ) + µhf ′(kt+1, gt+1)[1− Γt(µ2hf(kt+1, gt+1)σ2h)]}
(14)
u′(ct) = βu′(Vt+1)λt+1(1 + rt) (15)
From these two conditions we obtain
rt + δ = µhf
′(kt+1, gt+1)[1− Γt(µhf(kt+1, gt+1)σ2h)] (16)
The envelope condition is given by: u′[Vt(zt)]λt = u′(ct). By substituting
our assumed functional forms we obtain, ct = λtzt + bt − ψ lnλt Equating the
coeﬃcients on this and the assumed consumption function yields
λˆt = λt (17)
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and
bˆt = bt + ψ lnλt (18)
Taking account of this and assuming Γt = Γλt+1 we reformulate the FOC
with regards to at:
u′(ct) = βλt+1(1 + rt)u′
[
Vt+1
(
Etzt+1 − Γt
2
V artzt+1
)]
= βλt+1(1 + rt)u
′
(
λt+1Etzt+1 − Γ
2
λ2t+1V artzt+1 + bt+1 − ψ lnλt+1
)
(19)
(20)
by accounting for (17) and (18) we reduce the FOC to
u′(ct) = β(1 + rt)u′ [Etct+1 − ΓV art(ct+1)/2] (21)
(21) can be re-arranged to yield the Euler equation
Etct+1 − ct = ψ ln [β(1 + rt)] + Γ2t
[
µ2hf(kt+1, gt)
2σ2h
]
/(2Γ) (22)
So, for given interest rate path {rt}∞t=0, the investment demand is determined
by (16), and consumption decision is determined by (22).
3.5. Equilibrium
In equilibrium idiosyncratic risks cancel out and thus the aggregate dynamics
are deterministic, thus the interest rates are are equalized across the market.
Thus an equilibrium in an incomplete market is described by a deterministic
interest rate sequence {rt}∞t=0 and a set of plans ({cjt , kjt+1, ajt}∞t=0)j∈[0,1] chosen
by the households contingent on the history of the stochastic shocks to maximize
their life-time utility.
At the macro level the path of the economy is deterministic and given by a
sequence {Ct, Kt+1, rt}∞t=0. It is also assumed that in equilibrium the bond and
labour markets are cleared. Ct and Kt denote average consumption and capital
stock across the population. As Angeletos and Calvet (2006) show that assump-
tion of CARA preferences ensures that risk-taking is independent of wealth. As
the only risk we are assuming here is the risk associated with with the capital
income, the investment decision is also independent of wealth. The existence
of equilibrium for the current setting has been demonstrated by Angeletos and
Calvet (2004).
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For ex ante identical agents we have λit = λt and Γit = Γt, ∀i, t. This implies
that kit+1 = Kt+1. Then we can write
rt + δ = µhf
′(Kt+1, Gt+1)[1− Γt(µhf(Kt+1, Gt+1)σ2h)] (23)
Aggregating the Euler equation (22) across agents we obtain
Ct+1 − Ct = ψ ln [β(1 + rt)] + Γ2t
[
µ2hf(Kt+1, Gt+1)
2σ2h
]
/(2Γ) (24)
The resource constraint at the aggregate level is given by
Ct +Kt+1 = µhf(Kt, Gt) + (1− δ)Kt (25)
In the environment without corruption σh = 0, the marginal product of capital
is equated with the gross interest rate rt+δ = µhf ′(Kt+1, Gt+1). However, in the
uncertain environment due to corruption the mean return on investment should
be rewarded for the risk that is equal to Γtµ2hf ′(Kt+1, Gt+1)f(Kt+1, Gt+1)σ2h.
The second adverse eﬀect of corruption stems from the lower productive input
provision. In the environment with weak institutions the public input Gt+1 = θτy
with θ < 1 is lower due to misuse of public funds and tax evasion. In this case,
the marginal product of capital f ′(Kt+1, Gt+1) is less than in the environment
without corruption, where θ = 1.
We also know that in the environment without corruption the burden of the
public sector decreases the marginal product of capital by a factor of (1 − τ).
However, based on the earlier results of our analysis we infer that the burden of
the public sector with corruption exceeds the burden in the environment without
corruption. That is, in fact, equivalent to saying that the eﬀective public burden
in the corrupt environment is higher as µh = (1 − ετ), where ε > 1 due to ex-
tortion. Therefore, the private return on capital is lower than in the environment
with corruption. Hence, corruption further lowers the eﬀective marginal product
of capital, which entails lower capital accumulation.
The Euler equation (22) shows, as it was demonstrated by Bewley (1977),
Huggett (1997), Angeletos (2007), that the higher uncertainty in disposable
income leads to higher precautionary saving.
How is it possible that people save more and at the same time they invest
less? However, this contradiction stems from the concept that all savings should
be invested in somewhere. In other words, in equilibrium for a closed economy
we should observe equality of aggregate investment and saving,
It = St
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At the same time if saving rate is very high and demand for investment is
low then it is possible that the savers can except negative real interest rates.
Why will they do that? To smooth out their consumption in the face of income
uncertainties. The risk-averse agents can save some resources for the future
consumption even though they will loose in real terms.
In fact, in most developing countries with high income uncertainty and de-
veloped ﬁnancial markets, the savings are done as a stash of currency or even
just stock of foodstuﬀ and durables. It is clear that as proportion of their in-
come these people may save quite signiﬁcantly, while their savings do not aﬀect
directly the level of investment in the economy. In poor countries people often
rely on informal social safety networks to overcome hardships due to income un-
certainty. So, the saving of one family is given to other family in the network
for consumption, not investment. Therefore, its perfectly possible that due to
income uncertainty saving may be higher, whereas investment and thus capital
accumulation is lower.
The result is stated as Proposition.
Proposition: Income uncertainty caused by corruption requires a risk pre-
mium and thus leads to lower capital investment. This eﬀect of corruption further
ampliﬁes the decrease of capital accumulation caused by corruption induced in-
come redistribution and public sector ineﬃciency.
4. Conclusions
An analysis of a simple stochastic model that captures uncertainty in dispos-
able income caused by corruption demonstrates that risk averse agents invest
less. This adversely aﬀects growth. By modelling uncertainty created by corrup-
tion in the public sector, we ﬁnd that agents require risk-premiums on the returns
on their investment. This leads to less demand for investment and less capital
accumulation. Moreover, the expected burden of the public sector is greater
in the environment with corruption; consequently, the return on private capital
is lower. The lower returns on private capital shall lead to lower investments.
Consequently, corruption creates two adverse eﬀects in the economy: higher
risks associated with private investments and lower returns on private capital.
Both eﬀects tend to lower the demand for investments, thus long run growth is
compromised in the economy with the corrupt public sector.
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